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Introduction 
Large economic corporations play a central role in the economies of modern societies.  
Much of what we consume is produced and marketed by corporations, and many of us 
are employed by them.   Our economic fates appear to be inextricably linked to their 
actions.  Not for the first time, however, corporations are facing pressures to expand 
the scope of their concerns even further.  Two cases neatly illustrate the nature of 
these pressures.  First, movements promoting corporate social responsibility exert 
pressures on corporations to take account of the negative and positive consequences 
of their actions to third parties; they are requesting that corporations act as more than 
pure profit maximisers.  Second, political parties of the centre left, influenced by 
Third Way (Giddens 1998) thinking, have begun perceiving corporations as partners 
in the implementation of their policy objectives. A British example is the centrality of 
corporations to the delivery of New Labour’s policies such as the New Deal and the 
Private Finance Initiative.  It appears that trends are developing that could lead to 
corporations playing a larger role in our lives than they already do.   
 
These developments raise important questions   The ability of corporations to expand 
their roles, and its desirability, will surely vary depending on corporations’ and their 
directors’ pre-existing political and social interests.  Directors with distinct political 
sympathies may feel more comfortable acting as partners with governments that share 
their political commitments. Martin’s (2004) comparison of the differences in 
implementation of welfare to work policies in Denmark and Britain showed that 
variations in success across the two countries depended to a large extent on the 
willingness of corporate managers to act as partners with their governments.  What 
influences the political and social preferences of corporations and their directors, and 
how do those preferences affect their extra-market political and social behaviour? 
   
As far back as the 18
th
 Century, Adam Smith pointed out the potential for rent seeking 
and collusion among firms in the market.  Under certain circumstances, unregulated 
economic interests can act in ways that violate the public interest.  While locating 
corporations’ economic interests is relatively uncontroversial, identifying their 
political and social interests is more problematic, and yet these interests will surely 
influence the shape of any further expansion of corporations’ roles.  It is important to 
understand what can create failure in corporations’ extra-market behaviour that 
parallels our understandings of market failures.  
                                                                                                                   
It is not for lack of distinguished study that identifying corporations’ social and 
political interests is problematic.   Blame accrues more to disagreement than scholarly 
neglect.  The study of the social and political interests of economic actors, and 
particularly the agents and principals of firms, has classical roots traceable to Marx.  
His theory of capitalism in which societies are divided into economic classes clearly 
implies that the agents and principals of firms will hold a distinct set of social and 
political interests that guide their extra-market behaviour. More recent arguments 
range from Mills’ (1956) claim that directors will form part of a broader, united 
power elite to Dahl’s (1961) pluralist response that conflict as much as consensus 
determines firms’ social and political actions.             
 
Within the past 30-40 years the empirical study of corporations from a sociological 
perspective has undergone rapid growth (e.g. Scott and Griff 1984 and Mizruchi 
1992).  A lot of this scholarly progress is attributable to the development of social 
network analytic perspectives and techniques. These more easily permit the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of extra-market corporate relations that might 
influence corporate behaviour.  Much earlier scholarly disagreement rested on the 
inability to arbitrate between theories when empirical tests of their assumptions and 
predictions were not technically feasible.  The development of social network analysis 
has begun to limit the area of disagreement about what the corporate world ‘looks’ 
like (even if it has not entirely limited the scope of interpretation of how important its 
different features are).  But why should social network analysis, the study of social 
relations and social structure, better improve our ability to understand corporate 
political and social behaviour?  Two perspectives give different answers to this 
question.   
 
The first perspective is akin to social capital arguments (Coleman 1990, Putnam 
1998).  The social capital argument starts from the premise that many extra-market 
corporate actions will be individually unviable because the benefits that the acting 
corporation receives are less than the costs of taking the action, even when the sum of 
benefits accruing to all corporations is greater than the individual cost.  Social 
structure internalises the externalities of corporate political behaviour.  An example is 
Useem (1984) who argues that directors, who sit on multiple corporate boards, 
develop a classwide consciousness that increases their likelihood of taking corporate 
political action.   
The second perspective is an elite power perspective.  According to this perspective 
social networks are similar to x-rays, revealing to analysts which social groups are 
controlling corporate political action.  Corporations are vehicles for social groups 
promoting their own sectional interests; social networks help to identify which social 
groups are using corporations to promote their political interests. 
The central analytic difference between the two is that the social capital perspective 
focuses on the effects of social relations, while the elite power perspective focuses on 
social relations because they are good indicators of latent social groups and identities.  
The second major difference between the two is that the social capital empirical focus 
is on more bureaucratic relations like interlocking directorates, whereas the elite 
power empirical focus tends to be on extra-corporate socialising relations such as 
kinship and education. 
 
Aims and objectives 
The central aim of this research was to promote the development of the empirical 
study of the British corporate community in particular, and the study of corporate 
political action, in general.  The project was designed to help the scholarly community 
answer some of the questions raised in the Introduction.  It was conducted to provide 
data that would be relevant both to analysts of corporate political action and to a 
broader audience of social network analysts.  The achievement of these aims rested on 
meeting three key objectives 
• The creation of several new datasets.  These datasets would provide new 
social network information on the corporate community.  They would also 
include information on the behaviour of corporations and their directors.  
These data would be British but they would be of interest to an 
international community of scholars interested in corporate behaviour 
and/or social network methodology. 
• The structure of the intercorporate networks would be described and its 
central features measured. 
• Tests of association would be performed across corporations’ and 
directors’ positions in the intercorporate network and their behaviour. 
All three objectives were met.  Data on corporate networks and their behaviours 
across the period 97-01 (the duration of the first New Labour government) were 
collected.  In addition, we developed innovative ways of managing and integrating 
these complex data in Access databases.    We made much progress in measuring the 
structural features of the networks and identifying associations between corporations’ 
and directors’ positions in the networks and their social and political behaviour.  The 
main difficulty we had was the unexpected amount of time it took to collect and 
manage the large quantities of data that we collected.  Both the principle investigator 
and the part time research officer spent greater time on the project than planned as a 
result.  Future projects that involve collections of social network data from archival 
sources should include funding for a full time research officer.  This would permit the 
researchers to spend a greater amount of project time analysing, as opposed to 
collecting and organising, data.  Otherwise, no major difficulties were encountered 
during the project.  
Methods 
Data were collected on the largest 500 British corporations in 97/98 and the 3993 
directors who sat on their boards of directors.  Largeness was based on market 
capitalisation and the list was taken from the Financial Times 500.  Corporate data 
were collected for each year until 00/01.  There were two reasons for selecting the 
largest 500 corporations.  First, this is a practice that has been followed in previous 
studies of national corporate communities (e.g. Scott and Griff 1984; Mintz and 
Schwartz 1985).  Second, and more importantly, random samples do not allow the 
measurement of cohesive subgroups and role structures, that is, it is unlikely that in a 
random sample all members of a cohesive subgroup or role structure will be included 
(Granovetter 1976, Scott 1992 and Wasserman and Faust 1994).  Since large 
corporations tend to maintain most of their ties with each other, selecting the largest 
corporations mitigated this problem.  Selecting the largest corporations means that it 
is not legitimate to claim that one can generalise to a larger population, however.  
Significance tests will need to be based on a null model of randomisation of 
dependent variables.  Coefficient estimates will need to be compared with their values 
when the dependent variable is randomised across cases. 
 
We collected data on three intercorporate networks that have often been used to study 
corporate communities.  Data were collected on:  
1. The network of interlocking directorates.  Directors of one corporation sitting 
on the board of another create this network.  These data were collected from 
the Directory of Directors.  The directors for all corporations in the study were 
identified. 
2. The elite director networks of club and school ties.  These networks are 
created when directors from different corporations attended the same 
secondary school or are members of the same social club(s).  Networks can be 
created both for directors and their corporations.  Data were collected from 
Who’s Who, Who Was Who, Debretts and Who’s Who in Scotland.  
Typically, for research using these directories, data were not available for a 
large proportion of the directors: 1213/3993 (30%) of directors had entries in 
the directories.  There is an inclusion bias in the directories toward directors 
from larger corporations.   Most chief executives and chairman, however, who 
are likely to have greatest influence on corporate political and social 
behaviour, were included in the directories.  
3. Shareholding networks.  These are created when corporations in the sample 
have shareholdings in each other.  They are also created when shares in the 
corporations in the sample are held by the same organisations (these are based 
on affiliation networks where the rows are the study corporations and columns 
are shareholders).  All shareholders with holdings greater than 3% (only 
shareholders with greater than 3% of shares have to be declared) were 
identified for all corporations. 
4. Data were collected on a range of corporate behaviours.  These ranged from 
directors’ membership on Britain for Europe to corporate charitable donations.  
These were collected from a wide array of sources from corporations’ annual 
reports to petitions created by pressure groups. 
5. Further information was collected on corporations’ financial characteristics.  
These were collected from business directories and corporations’ annual 
reports.  Data were collected for all corporations. 
 
These data are collected together in NxN case-by-case intercorporate networks and 
NxM case by variable arrays where for each corporation there are data on set of M 
attribute variables. 
Results 
A great deal of data was collected and there are many questions that can be addressed 
using the dataset.  To date, the analyses have focused on the interlocking directorate 
networks and the club and school elite networks.  The analyses have also focussed on 
the 97/98 networks.  The next steps will be to analyse the shareholding data and to 
explore how the networks change over time. 
This section of the report will start by describing some of the key structural features 
of the networks in 97/98
1
 while the next section will examine how those features have 
affected corporate behaviour. 
Structure- directors 
Directors and their corporations are the two types of actor whose structural position 
we are trying to identify.  As pointed out over thirty years ago by Breiger (1974), the 
networks of individuals and the networks of organizations they belong to do not have 
a simple relationship.   We will begin this section by examining some features of 
directors’ relationships. 
Table 1 displays the number of directors having single and multiple directorships and 
the mean number of directorships held by directors.  Most directors in the sample sit 
 
Table 1. Number of directorships held by directors 
 1 2 3 4 5+ Mean no. 
88.30+ 8.59 2.45 0.60 0.001 % 
(n) (3525) (343) (98) (24) (2) 
1.16 
+Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding errors 
on only a single board.  Approximately one in nine directors sits on more than a single 
board, thereby meeting Useem’s (1984) criterion for inner circle membership.  
Approximately 3% of directors sit on more than 2 boards. 
Multiple directorships link directors in specifically corporate and bureaucratic ways.  
Directors are also linked through their shared educational background and by their 
joint membership of social clubs.  Table 2 displays the 15 most common schools and 
social clubs that directors are affiliated to. 
 
                                                
1
 This year was chosen because it includes all corporations and directors in the sample.  In following 
years there was attrition through liquidations and mergers.  Also, to date, we have focussed our 
analyses on the network in this year. 
    
Table 2. Directors’ most popular schools and social club 
Schools   Social Clubs 
Name n Name n 
Eton 90 Royal Automobile 
Club (RAC) 
91 
Winchester 28 Marylebone 
Cricket Club 
(MCC) 
89 
Harrow 26 Brooks’s 66 
Charterhouse 21 Boodles 57 
Marlborough 20 Athenaeum 49 
Rugby 16 White’s 38 
Ampleforth 13 Garrick 35 
Haileybury 13 Reform 31 
Tonbridge 11 Oxford and 
Cambridge 
28 
Shrewsbury 10 Hurlingham 26 
Uppingham 9 Pratts 26 
Wellington 9 New 25 
Westminster 9 Beefsteak 22 
Stowe 8 Carlton 22 
    
The list of schools represents a roll call of some of Britain’s most prestigious private 
sector boarding schools.  The most striking finding is the extremely large number of 
old Etonian directors.  There are almost as many old Etonians as there are directors 
who attended the next four most popular schools combined. 
 
There is a more even distribution of directors across the most prominent social clubs.  
A range of clubs is represented including typically establishment clubs like White’s 
and Boodles, while also including less traditional clubs like the RAC.  The clubs are 
also largely English with the exception of the New club, which is in Edinburgh. 
 
Schools are an indicator of social origins while social clubs are indicators of social 
destinations.  Table 3 cross-tabulates the five most popular schools by the top 15 
clubs.  It shows that the directors from the most popular schools do not tend to be 
members of the most popular clubs; instead, they are drawn to social clubs like 
White’s, Pratts and Boodles.  For, example only two (2%) old Etonian directors are 
members of the RAC, while 19 (21%) are members of Whites.   
Table 3. Most popular clubs by most popular schools  
 Eton 
%+ 
(n) 
Winchester 
% 
(n) 
Harrow 
% 
(n) 
Charterhouse 
% 
(n) 
Marlborough 
% 
(n) 
Total proportion of club 
members coming from 5 most 
popular schools 
Royal 
Automobile 
Club 
(RAC) 
2 
(2) 
4 
(1) 
4 
(1) 
10 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
7 
(6) 
Marylebone 
Cricket 
Club 
(MCC) 
8 
(7) 
7 
(2) 
15 
(4) 
24 
(5) 
10 
(2) 
22 
(20) 
Brooks’s 11 
(10) 
21 
(6) 
19 
(6) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(1) 
35 
(23) 
Boodles 17 
(15) 
7 
(2) 
19 
(6) 
10 
(2) 
15 
(3) 
49 
(28) 
Athenaeum 0 
(0) 
11 
(3) 
4 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
20 
(4) 
16 
(8) 
White’s 21 
(19) 
4 
(1) 
4 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
55 
(21) 
Garrick 3 
(3) 
0 
(0) 
12 
(3) 
10 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
23 
(8) 
Reform 0 
(0) 
4 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(1) 
5 
(1) 
10 
(3) 
Oxford and 
Cambridge 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(1) 
4 
(1) 
Hurlingham 0 
(0) 
7 
(2) 
4 
(1) 
5 
(1) 
5 
(1) 
19 
(5) 
Pratts 10 
(9) 
0 
(0) 
12 
(3) 
5 
(1) 
10 
(2) 
54 
(14) 
New 8 
(7) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
32 
(8) 
Beefsteak 6 
(5) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(1) 
32 
(7) 
Carlton 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
10 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
9 
(2) 
   + The denominator is the number who attended each school.  Directors could be members of more than one club. 
Structure- corporations 
In this section we describe the structural properties of the intercorporate networks. 
.   
Table 4 displays some measures of the network of interlocking directorates.   
Approximately three-quarters of all corporations were in the largest connected 
component.  Corporations were interlocked with an average of 3.22 (min:0- max: 6) 
other corporations.  The network exhibits small world (Watts 1999) properties as its 
mean distance does not depart much from what would be expected in a random 
network and yet there is quite a bit of transitivity in corporations’ ego networks.  
These results are consistent with most descriptions of national intercorporate 
networks.    
 
Table 4. Structural properties of network of interlocking directorates 
Density Mean degree Size of largest 
connected 
component 
Mean distance Clustering 
coefficient 
0.001 3.22 374 4.67 0.291 
 
Descriptions of the structure of relations created by corporations through club and 
school ties are obtained by a simultaneous partitioning of the networks of club and 
school ties using Concor (White et al. 1976). 
Table 5 Mean value tables schools and clubs 
Clubs  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
             1 1.44 0.557 0.190 0.503 0.00 0.009 0.000 
2 0.557 0.866 0.199 0.595 0.002 0.004 0.000 
3 0.190 0.199 0.692 0.442 0.004 0.004 0.000 
4 0.503 0.595 0.442 0.661 0.003 0.007 0.000 
5 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.029 0.010 0.000 
6 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.068 0.000 
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Schools 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
             1 0.065 0.077 0.053 0.247 0.013 0.065 0.000 
2 0.077 0.085 0.057 0.317 0.013 0.072 0.000 
3 0.053 0.057 0.069 0.189 0.005 0.050 0.000 
4 0.247 0.317 0.189 2.095 0.010 0.350 0.000 
5 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.010 0.029 0.010 0.000 
6 0.065 0.072 0.050 0.350 0.010 0.068 0.000 
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Block 1 n = 96; block 2 n = 170; block 3 n = 47; block 4 n = 48; block 5 n = 24; 
block 6 n= 34 block 7 n = 81 
.  
These tables show the mean number of ties between corporations across the seven 
partitions.  A few features of the table that stand out include: 1) Most social 
similarities and relations can be found amongst the first four blocks, 2) All of the first 
four blocks show high levels of club sociability among directors 3) blocks1 and 2  
show the highest level of club sociability, 4) Block 4 shows high levels of shared 
educational background amongst its members; however, the other blocks show low 
levels. 
 
Table 6 shows the list of the three largest numbers of clubs and schools that connected  
 
Table 6.  Clubs and schools with the three largest number of directors for each block (Number of 
directorships that are filled by divided by number of corporations in block) 
Block 1 
 
Block 2 
 
Block 3 Block 4 
 
RAC (1.27)+ 
MCC    (.26) 
 Athenaeum (.21) 
MCC (.53) 
Brooks’s (.50) 
Athenaeum  (.30) 
 
Boodles (.48) 
New  (.38) 
Royal and 
Ancient Golf 
(.34) 
 
Boodles  (.52) 
Whites (.33) 
MCC (.33) 
Schools 
Eton (.13) 
Charterhouse (.09) 
Marlborough (.07) 
 
Eton (.16) 
Marlborough (.09) 
Winchester (.09) 
 
Glasgow 
Academy (.13) 
 Edinburgh 
Academy (.11) 
Charterhouse 
(.11) 
Eton  (1.4) 
Harrow (.28) 
Winchester 
(.23) 
 
    
the first four blocks.  Six features of these results are especially noteworthy: 1) Block 
1 is the block held together by directors who are members of the RAC, 2) Block 2 is a 
highly sociable block in the club tie network (with the proviso that it does not include 
many RAC directors), 3) block three is held together by directors with Scottish 
affiliations at both the school and club levels, 4) block 4 is held together by old 
Etonian directors, 5) While Eton is the most prominent school in blocks 1,2 and 4, the 
proportions of corporations with old Etonian directors in blocks 1 and 2 are 
approximately one-tenth the proportion of block 4’s and 6) The finding that 
proportions of directorships held by RAC members in block 1 and directorships held 
by old Etonians in block 4 are both greater than one, indicates that it is common for 
corporations in these blocks to have more than a single RAC member (in the case of 
block 1) or a single old Etonian (in the case of block 4). 
 
Corporate political and social behaviour 
However interesting the structures of relations between corporations may be, their 
social scientific utility lies in whether they correlate with corporate behaviours.  One 
of the central criticisms of studies using social network analyses is that they lack 
dependent variables (Stinchcombe 1989).  The results in the last section should help 
us predict the behaviour of both directors and the corporations whose boards they sit 
on.  
 
Table 7 displays the mean number of directorships and the top five schools and clubs 
attended by directors who are members of Business for Sterling a prominent pressure 
group opposing the idea of Britain joining the Eurozone. 
 
 
 
 Table 7.  Member of Business for Sterling by directors’ social relations 
Mean number of directorships 
Member of Business for Sterling: 1.43 Non-members: 1.15* 
 Clubs  
 White’s MCC Brooks’s Boodles Pratts 
Members of Bfs 
(n) 
11 9 7 7 6 
Proportion of 
members of BfS 
who are members 
of Club  
12% 10% 7% 7% 6% 
Proportions of 
members of clubs 
who are members 
of BfS (%) 
29% 10% 11% 12% 26% 
Schools 
 Eton Winchester Charterhouse Ampleforth Haileybury 
Members of Bfs 
(n) 
7 4 4 3 3 
Proportion of 
members of BfS 
who are members 
of School  
7% 4% 4% 3% 3% 
Proportions of 
members of 
schools who are 
members of BfS  
8% 14% 19% 23% 23% 
p<.0.05 
Ninety-two of the directors in the sample were members of Business for Sterling 
(BfS).  As would be predicted by Useem (1984), directors who are members of BfS 
have a greater mean number of directorships than those who are not members, 
although the difference is not great.  Members of BfS contain a greater number of 
club members than non-members, but they come from a select group of high status 
clubs including White’s.  The proportion of directors who are members of the high 
status clubs who are also members of BfS is also high; for example 29% of White’s 
members were members of BfS but only 4% of RAC directors were members.  
Members of BfS also have greater proportion of directors from high status schools 
like Eton.   Similar results were also found for directors who were donors to the 
Conservatives. 
Table 8 looks at corporations’ donations to the Conservatives.  In the 97/98 financial 
year 23 corporations made donations to the Conservatives.  Donors had significantly 
greater number of ties to other corporations through interlocking directorates.   
Table 8.  Donor to the Conservatives by corporations’ social relations 
Mean number of interlocks 
Donor: 4.96 Non-members: 3.13* 
 Clubs  
  Block 
1 
 
Block 
2 
Block 
3 
Block 
4 
Block 
5 
Block 
6 
Block 
7 
% 4  5      2       17 4 3 0 Donor** 
(n) (4)  (8)       (1)       (8) (1) (1) (0) 
 
% 
 
96 
 
 
95 
 
   98 
 
    83 
 
96 
 
97 
 
100 
(n) (92) (162)    (46)     (40)  (23) (33) (81) 
 
Not 
donor 
        
 ** p<0.01 
 
The results confirm the inner circle thesis again.   
The proportion of donors also varied across blocks.  The proportion of donors in the 
‘Eton’ block (block 3) was at least 3 times greater than in any other block.  
Approximately one-third of donors were from block 3 although it contained one tenth 
of all corporations.  The second major finding is that none of the corporations in the 
isolate block, block 7, made a donation.  Similar results have been obtained in tests of 
corporations’ likelihood of joining Business in the Community and making donations 
to charity.   
 
Discussion of results and summary of main findings 
  
The results of the analysis to date have 1) outlined the main structural features of the 
networks and 2) given examples of how corporate political and social behaviour 
varies across network position.  The results have confirmed the relevance of the 
sociological approaches to corporate political behaviour.  There are results that are 
consistent with both the social capital and elite power approaches. 
Some of the key findings to date were: 
 
• There were 467 directors who sat on more than a single board.  There were 
3992 directors in total. 
• The most popular schools attended by the directors were prestigious, private 
sector boarding schools.  Eton was clearly the most common school attended 
by directors in the sample. 
• Directors were members of a mixed variety of clubs.  The most popular clubs 
were the RAC and the MCC. 
• There was a lack of overlap among directors who attended the most common 
schools and the most popular clubs.  Directors who attended private sector 
boarding schools like Eton did not join popular clubs like the RAC; instead 
they tended to join more traditional, high status clubs like White’s or Pratts. 
• The network of interlocking directorates contained a large component with 
approximate three-quarters of corporations, was sparse, showed small world 
characteristics and the mean number of ties was 3.22. 
• The corporate network created by club and school ties was partitioned into 
seven blocks.  Three of them had few or no club and school ties, one of them 
was an RAC block, another was block created by directors who joined 
popular clubs (other than the RAC), one was a Scottish block and another was 
an old Etonian block. 
• Directors who sat on more than a single board were more likely to join 
business for sterling and make donations to the Conservatives. 
• Directors who attended high status clubs and attended private sector boarding 
schools were more likely to join Business for Sterling and make donations to 
the Conservatives.   
• Corporations that had many interlocks were more likely to be donors, join 
business in the community and make charitable donations. 
• The block created by old Etonian directors contained the greatest proportion 
of donors while the isolate block contained no donors.   
 
Activities 
Conferences and networks: 
 
Interim results have been presented to both national and international audiences: 
 
Department of sociology seminar, University of Oxford (20005) 
CabDyn complexity seminar, University of Oxford (2005) 
Social network group, University of Greenwich (2006) 
Sunbelt conference of International Network of Social Network Analysts, Vancouver 
(2006) 
 
The results will also be presented at the University of Barcelona to a network of 
European and American scholars interested in the political actions of large 
corporations.  The research team helped co-found the network. 
 
Outputs 
Publications 
A paper (‘Elite social relations and the political behaviour of individual directors’) 
that was presented at the Sunbelt conference is nearing completion. 
 
It is aimed to publish the results in relevant, major peer-reviewed journals (e.g. British 
Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review and Sociology).  A book 
proposal examining the development of corporate political action during the New 
Labour government is being prepared. 
 
The study datasets 
 The datasets arising from the study have been offered to Data Archive. 
Impact 
The results of this study will contribute to the study corporations, their relations with 
each other and the their political and social behaviour.  The datasets arising from the 
study should be of interest to a wide range of scholars.  When the data are archived 
this will be announced through socnet, the electronic mailing list of the International 
Network of Social Network Analysis. 
 
Future research priorities 
This research focussed on a single country.  Future research would be best promoted 
if it were cross-national.  Cross-national research on comparable datasets would allow 
us understand what the general forces are promoting extra-market corporate political 
behaviour.    
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